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Introduction
This paper examines Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenom-
enological ontology; demonstrating that imagination 
is an important experiential dimension of archi-
tecture [Fig. 1]. Sartre posits that absence is the 
unconditional principle of all imagination.1 Thus, 
architecture that attempts to account for absence 
- in-situ commemorative structures (space), sacred 
sites (place), and spontaneous memorials (loca-
tion) - are singled out here. They provide tangible 
evidence of the absent. Although, these examples 
are often discussed under the rubric of memory 
making, they also trigger imagination. Sartre distin-
guishes imagination from remembering, perceiving, 
and other more passive types of consciousness.2 
It is argued here that, by understanding how direct 
experiences with places that account for absence 
invite imagination, we may gain insight into an ontol-
ogy of architecture.
The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, Martin 
Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty feature 
frequently in architectural theories regarding expe-
rience. So why are Sartre’s phenomenology and 
views on imagination salient? First, Sartre offers 
an interpretation of imagination that is in relation-
ship to the world, invited by the physical objects and 
spaces we encounter. For example, walking down 
the street you see a building on the corner. You 
can only perceive two sides of this building, but you 
know there is a whole physical object - the building 
- there. You don’t perceive the entirety of the build-
ing, but there is a ‘real sense’ that you perceive the 
whole building. In terms of the Sartrean imagina-
tion, you see the whole building, but not the whole 
of the building; linking imaging with imagining.3 Like 
Husserl’s phenomenology, Sartre’s work accepts the 
qualitative messiness of the world. Unlike Husserl, 
Sartre does not bracket off phenomena to determine 
their essential structure. Instead Sartre’s imagining 
consciousness remains enmeshed within the rich 
milieu of the world, oscillating between being and 
nothingness. Indeed, Sartre’s writing is filled with 
anecdotes from a very chaotic and concrete world, 
ranging from looking down bustling city streets to 
observing the behaviours of a busy waiter. Thus, his 
views may be very relevant to explorations of archi-
tecture that situate and are situated by this world. 
Influenced by Heidegger, Sartre also concerns 
himself with being in the world. However, the two 
philosophers’ approaches to being are distinct. 
Unlike Heidegger, Sartre does not eschew a dual-
istic ontology, but uses it as a starting point for his 
phenomenology.4 For Sartre, you can no more be 
the table you are encountering, than the table can 
be you. According to philosopher Robert Bernas-
coni, ‘neither consciousness, nor “the thing”, 
has priority’.5 Sartre’s binary distinction between 
consciousness and the external world is where 
encounters start. Moreover, this dualism can only 
be overcome by descriptions,6 and these descrip-
tions come in rich and varied forms. Sartre wrote 
academic texts, but also short stories, novels, plays, 
and political analyses. 
You Are Not Here: Sartre’s Phenomenological Ontology and the 
Architecture of Absence
Susan Herrington
03
52
Fig. 1: Jean-Paul Sartre
53
he turned the pages, the objects which he touched 
are in themselves only books, objects, i.e., full actu-
alities. The very traces which he has left can be 
deciphered as traces of him only within a situation 
where he has been already appointed as absent. 
Pierre’s absence, in order to be established or real-
ized, requires a negative moment. If in terms of my 
perceptions of the room, I conceive of the former 
inhabitant who is no longer in the room, I am of 
necessity to produce an act of thought which no 
prior state can determine nor motivate, in short to 
effect in myself a break in being.13
In this way, being is an intentional activity structuring 
reality where there are ‘breaks’ of nothingness. This 
reciprocal relationship between ‘being’ and ‘nothing-
ness,’ posits that nothingness is born from negation 
and it cannot exist apart from being because noth-
ingness occurs through consciousness. In short, 
Pierre’s non-existence in the room is dependent on 
Pierre at one point being there and his absence is 
experienced as present. 
For Sartre, ‘every psychic process of nega-
tion implies a cleavage between the past and the 
present - this cleavage is nothingness’.14 Pierre’s 
absence can be spatial. He can be in another part 
of the city, for example. Absence can be temporal 
as well. Pierre is dead. Moreover, we do not need 
to have had a direct experience with the absent. 
Sartre writes in The Imaginary: 
I look, for example, at a portrait of Charles VIII at the 
Uffizi in Florence. I know that it is Charles VIII who is 
dead. But on the other hand in the imagined state: 
the dead Charles VIII is there present before us. It 
is he that we see, not the picture, and yet we posit 
him as not being there. We have only reached him 
‘as imaged,’ ‘by the intermediary’ of the picture. One 
sees that the relation that consciousness posits in 
the imaging attitude between the portrait and its 
subject is magical.15
Lastly, Sartre builds upon Merleau-Ponty’s bodily 
engagement by positing perception as imagination; 
an activity that is ultimately linked to human free-
dom.7 The ability to imagine is what makes us free. 
Sartre’s views on freedom ultimately took political 
aim. The fact that humans are free, ontologically 
speaking, gives meaning to oppression.8 Revealing 
the role of an imagining consciousness of architec-
ture is certainly pertinent to architectural education. 
Given the free fall of representational media avail-
able to architecture students, it is entirely possible 
that the very human ability to imagine through direct 
experiences is eroding. This may have repercus-
sions outside of academic institutions, because 
imagination is central to cognitive processes. 
According to developmental psychologists, imagina-
tion is not only the engine of creativity, but it enables 
us to make rational decisions.9
Unfortunately, Sartre’s phenomenology has been 
overlooked in aesthetics as well.10 However, with 
Arthur Danto’s claim that Sartre’s phenomenologi-
cal ontology is ‘a piece of ambitious metaphysical 
architecture, not just a description of what is there,’11 
Sartre’s work is being reconsidered in aesthetics. 
Scholars revisiting his work find that consciousness 
is an imaginative act that not only reveals present 
meaning, but enables ‘us to think of the world other 
than it is,’12 a vital activity for educators, researcher, 
and practitioners who are often charged with this 
task.
The Space of Negation 
In Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomeno-
logical Ontology Sartre describes the complimentary 
processes of being and nothingness. At the heart of 
being for Sartre is the process of negation. Negation 
is a powerful tool of the imagining consciousness 
that arises from being in the world. It colours experi-
ence and gives it depth. Sartre describes negation 
by telling a story of Pierre’s absence from a room. 
The room of someone absent, the books of which 
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Fig. 2: The canal house Prinsengracht 263, where Anne Frank spent fifteen months in hiding, Amsterdam, The Nether-
lands.
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Walking on the creaky floorboards that regis-
ter every move, you realise that the building is an 
accomplice, but also a betrayal to their hiding. The 
wooden floors, thin walls, and rudimentary plumb-
ing render the existence of its hiding inhabitants. 
In a small corridor space, a wall registers human 
dimensions with markings of the final heights of Otto 
Frank’s children, measures no parent ever wants to 
know. Entering Anne’s room, you immediately notice 
the faded clippings of celebrities that are taped to 
her wall. The invented life of movie stars, the private 
world of a diary, and the buoyancy of hope must 
have supplanted the real lives suspended in these 
rooms. Indeed, the absence of Anne is everywhere, 
profoundly shaping your imagining consciousness 
of her as absent.
According to Sartre, we know who is absent is not 
real. They are irreal. In order for the qualities of the 
real to appear as irreal, we must believe that the 
analogon refers to something true about the real. 
This is what disturbs architect Mabel O. Wilson 
during her visit to the Lorraine Motel in Memphis, 
Tennessee.17 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assas-
sinated on the balcony of this motel on April 4, 1968, 
after staying as a guest in room 307. In the follow-
ing years, the motel’s owner preserved Dr. King’s 
room and several adjoining rooms as a shrine. In 
the 1980s the Martin Luther King Memorial Founda-
tion raised enough funds to purchase the motel and 
build around it the National Civil Rights Museum, 
which opened in 1991. After an extensive expan-
sion in 2001, including adjacent buildings, today it 
offers all the amenities of an in-situ memorial and 
museum, with traveling exhibits, life-size dioramas, 
education activities for children, and a bookshop. 
Visiting the museum, one can experience a 
portion of the saved motel and surrounding land-
scape. Knowledge of King’s fate contrasts sharply 
with the optimism of the motel’s boomerang neon 
sign, and the parking lot containing cars from the 
1950s and 1960s [Fig. 3]. The new museum has 
Thus, the painting (physical representation) gives 
Charles VIII, though he is not there. Like Charles 
VIII’s mental counterpart or representation, we are 
conscious of this due to the negation of present 
reality. The painting of the deceased monarch and 
the room devoid of Pierre are what Sartre calls ‘anal-
ogons’. According to Adrienne Dengerink Chaplin, 
an analogon is the ‘physical matter of the image to 
the extent that it allows us to see it as a represen-
tation of something’.16 An analogon invites us and 
through it we call forth Charles VIII, not the painting 
of Charles VIII. 
Consider 263 Prinsengracht in Amsterdam, the 
canal house where Anne Frank spent fifteen months 
in hiding with seven other Jews [Fig. 2]. During its 
restoration in 1960 as a memorial and youth center, 
the secret annex was left in its original condition 
as much as possible. Since this time, exhibition 
spaces at 265 and 267 Prinsengracht have been 
connected to the four-storey canal house to narrate 
and contextualise Anne Frank’s story and the Holo-
caust. In addition to these physical developments, 
the house has been painstakingly documented virtu-
ally. Detailed computer models depict the layout of 
the house and annex, and a live webcam gives you 
a view from the annex window to the chestnut tree 
that Anne writes about in her diary. 
Visiting the house today, one must navigate 
through numerous exhibits and video installations, 
and other tourists. Yet, once behind the bookcase 
at the end of the corridor on the third floor, you climb 
into a space that prompts negation [Fig. 2]. What 
strikes you first is the palpable emptiness of the 
annex. After the arrests of those in hiding, all major 
furniture, clothing, and other items were removed 
and redistributed to people who lost their effects in 
bombing raids. This was a common practice of the 
Nazi regime; conflating the desire to obliterate with 
the need to accommodate in acts that only fascism 
can rationalise. 
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Fig. 3: Lorraine Motel in Memphis in the National Civil Rights Museum, Tennessee. Courtesy of Martin Lewis.
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failure, and Sartre’s monographs of nineteenth-cen-
tury writers and poets.20 However, there may also 
be links between religious experiences and nega-
tion. Sartre himself posits that imagination provides 
a realm beyond the reach of the senses, noting: 
‘imagination, far from appearing as an accidental 
characteristic of consciousness, is disclosed as an 
essential and transcendental condition of conscious-
ness’.21 Raoul Mortley notes that the role of silence 
in many Western religions is a form of negative 
theology.  According to Mortley, silence was a ‘part 
of the protocol in mysteries; a ritual recognition of 
the awesomeness of the divinity, and apart from its 
ritual value it also had real value, in that the divine 
presence was thought to strike dumb’.22 Certainly 
moments of silence are not only practiced in reli-
gious experiences with sacred places, but also in 
more general acts of mourning or commemoration. 
Moreover, in the practices of Shinto, a Japanese 
folk religion, negation is integral to experiencing its 
sacred sites.23
Closely tied to Buddhism, Shinto venerates spirits 
(kami) in both animate and inanimate objects. 
Shinto complexes occupy sacred sites where the 
absence of a shrine structure is equally important to 
its presence. Consider Ise Jingu [Fig. 4], the most 
sacred Shinto shrine complex in Japan. It contains 
an Outer Shrine (Geku), which venerates Toyouke, 
the kami of clothing, food and housing, and the 
Inner Shrine (Naiku), which is dedicated to the Sun 
Goddess and progenitor of the Imperial Family, 
Amaterasu. Like many Shinto shrine complexes, its 
sacred structures have been rebuilt ‘anew’ every 20 
years since the seventh century (with several lapses 
due to war). Called ‘shikinen sengu’, this rebuilding 
process involves a serious material commitment of 
approximately 16,000 cypress trees that are ideally 
200 years old and at least 60 centimeters in diam-
eter. The felling, transport and preparation of these 
special trees, as well as the creation of numerous 
ceremonial items, adhere to a set of elaborate 
Shinto rituals, which take eight years to complete.24
been built around the preserved motel. Inside, 
exhibits and dioramas tell of the struggles of the 
civil rights movement. At the end of the tour, you 
can enter the saved motel through a vestibule that 
provides views into two rooms, both labeled 307. As 
Wilson notes, King’s original room was destroyed to 
construct this viewing vestibule [Fig. 3]. She notes 
that by displaying the two rooms (which were never 
room 307), memory is not constructed for the visitor. 
Be that as it may, the destruction of the room might 
inhibit negation, because King did not stay in these 
rooms. The analogon is not true.
In addition to the analogon containing something 
that is genuine, the power of the analogon is in 
direct proportion to the degree to which absence 
is relevant. Anne Frank’s absence from the secret 
annex or Martin Luther King Jr.’s absence from the 
Lorraine Motel will exude greater imaginative force 
than Rodin’s absence from his preserved studio 
at the Hôtel Biron, now the Musée Rodin. Anne 
Frank’s death is relevant to the Holocaust as Dr. 
Martin Luther King’s absence is meaningful to the 
struggles of the Civil Rights Movement. 
The Place of Nothingness 
The connections between religious experience 
and imagination have been well documented. 
On the contrary, Sartre professed no interest or 
belief in religious experience, and never directly 
compared negation with religious thought. In fact, 
he spent most of his life refuting the Catholic reli-
gion. Nonetheless, analyses of his writing find him a 
‘spirit-haunted atheist’.18 Christina Howells reveals 
implicit connections between Sartre’s being and 
nothingness and the negative tradition of religious 
beliefs. Howells argues that the ontological status 
of nothingness given by Sartre protects human 
consciousness from materialism, which holds that 
only matter truly exists.19  
Howell draws connections between religious 
concepts, such as the idea of salvation through 
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Fig. 4: The Ise Jingu Shinto shrine complex, Ise, Mie prefecture, Japan. Courtesy of Dominic McIver Lopes.
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paper works and the fact that thirty percent of Tokyo 
is rebuilt every year.28 The ontological question 
posed by Lopes asks: is Ise more than a thousand 
years old or is it only twenty years old? According 
to Lopes the permanence of Japanese architec-
ture is achieved through consistent rebuilding.29 He 
concludes that ‘some architectural works are to be 
appreciated more like plays than like statues’.30 In 
effect, Ise’s shrines are over 1300 years old and 
they have appeared sixty times.31 Importantly, expe-
riencing these performances of Ise invites negation 
as part of what they are.
Building upon the Japanese concept of ‘ma,’ 
which values the intervals or gaps between build-
ings, Lindsay Jones posits that this negative space 
serves as a magnet for kami. A gap is created, ‘a 
“negative space,” a sacred ma, a vacuum into which 
rushes the formless energy of (ki) of kami’.32 One 
would need to be of Shinto faith to experience ma. 
Nonetheless, given the emphasis on what is not 
there at Ise, it is evident for non-Shinto visitors that 
negation is integral to a religious experience with 
Ise.
The Location of Being
Both the Anne Frank house and Ise Jingu invite our 
imagination through negation. They function as anal-
ogons. An analogon prompts imagination because it 
is the ‘imperfect and muddled appearance of what 
it could be through what it is’.33 Thus far, encounter-
ing nothingness has not considered other people. 
Sartre’s thoughts on ‘others’ are introduced in Being 
and Nothingness and later in Critique of Dialectical 
Reason, where he includes others in experiences of 
collective groups or group praxis. These are expe-
riences that both give meaning to existence and 
oblige us to a set of customs and behaviours. For 
Sartre, it is the worked-matter that we encounter 
in everyday experiences that link us to the collec-
tive. This is because much of this matter is more 
than what it is, and it is a type of being that plays a 
special role in Sartre’s structure of consciousness. 
Approaching the main shrine to Amaterasu at 
Naiku, the entire experience is shrouded in what you 
cannot see. Echoing Basil Chamberlin’s warning to 
19th century travelers to Ise, ‘there is nothing to see 
and they won’t let you see it;’25 once you have arrived 
at the gate to the main shrine, you are turned away. 
While average people are encouraged to pilgrim-
age to Ise, the Imperial family and their priests only 
access the inner sanctums of both the Naiku and 
Geku shrines. Most visitors can only stand at the 
entry gate and imagine what lies beyond. This is 
remindful of Sartre who notes, ‘one must imagine 
what one is denied’.26
In the 1950s, Watanabe Yoshio was allowed to 
photograph the inner shrine areas of Ise. Johnathan 
Reynolds posits that these published images 
provided a visual documentation of Ise that stressed 
the ‘very material substance’ of the architectural 
experience.27 Indeed, Yoshio’s photographs as well 
as contemporary imagery of the outer shrine struc-
tures exude materiality. The pristine ground plane, 
the seemingly perfect wood members and geomet-
ric orthodoxy of the shrine, and the taunt bristles of 
its thatched roof, emphasise its material beauty.
 
Nonetheless, during a direct experience with Ise, 
what is most striking is the fact that the raised plinth 
accommodating the shrine is next to an equally 
large flat empty space. Surfaced with small white 
pebbles and one tiny shed-like structure, this space 
is called ‘kodenchi’. It denotes the place where the 
shrine structure from the last sengu is now absent. 
The next shrine will be built on the kodenchi, and 
the current site with the shrine will be taken down 
and become the kodenchi. The space that does not 
contain the shrine, is always part of what the shrine 
complex is and how it is experienced.
Philosopher Dominic Lopes, argues that ‘shik-
inen sengu’ provides an ontology of Japanese 
architecture that extends beyond Shinto shrines to 
present-day architecture, such as Shigeru Ban’s 
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Fig. 5: Spontaneous memorial of Flight 93, Shangsville, Pennsylvania, USA. Courtesy of Cynthia Girling and Ron 
Kellett.
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simultaneously acknowledging the individual as a 
group member - and it arises out of scarcity and 
need.40 While Sartre largely concerned himself with 
class status or warring states as particular forms 
of group praxis, other groups with specific relation-
ships in the world can also be considered.
The rise of spontaneous memorials is an example 
where both worked- matter and how it relates to 
the individual and the group, provide moments of 
collective praxis. Their popularity in recent decades 
may also point to a need or scarcity in society. While 
competitions for professionally designed memori-
als have become commonplace since the Vietnam 
Memorial competition in Washington D.C., so have 
spontaneous memorials prompted by Lin’s design. 
Spontaneous memorials are created when people 
en masse bring items to the location of a tragedy - a 
murder, a car accident, a shooting, or a bombing. 
Along with flags and flowers, these items can be 
the most mundane of personal effects, including 
baseball caps, candles, cards, stuffed animals, wind 
chimes, t-shirts, or photographs. A bottle of ‘Old 
Spice’ left at a spontaneous memorial is no longer 
simply a toiletry product, but rather an analogon 
that calls forth the deceased by giving us what he 
smelled like. It prompts us to imagine the aftershave 
other than it is; the being for-itself haunts being in-it-
self in the context for-others. 
Some of these items may have belonged to the 
deceased, but many are possessions of the living. 
According to Harriet Senie, ‘like the ground on which 
they rest these ritual objects are seen as somehow 
sacred - as artifacts that should not be destroyed’.41 
In the case of many prominent spontaneous memo-
rials, where the contributions of items quickly 
outgrow the fence, items are collected, catalogued, 
and saved for a future, permanent memorial. 
There are virtual memorials for all the 9-11 terror-
ist attacks in the United States, yet the physical 
places of the attacks still attract people. Immediately 
Sartre proposes that the structure of conscious-
ness rests upon the basic premise that ‘to be aware 
of an object is not to be the object’.34 Thus being has 
two forms: in-itself (en-soi) and for-itself (pour-soi).35 
En-soi is a thing that exists and is not conscious of 
itself, a table for example, and it can be anything 
that one is conscious of. Pour-soi exists but it is 
conscious of itself, you for example. While en-soi 
and pour-soi have different features, human reality 
consistently fuses them. According to Hazel E. 
Barnes, these are types of being ‘in which psychic 
overlay and matter have been blended’.36 They are 
worked-matter that includes ‘all the human stamped 
physical and cultural environments (bus routes, 
institutions, customs, and so on) in which we live’.37 
As Sartre describes:
I need only glance out the window and: I will be able 
to see which are men and drivers, who are cars, a 
policemen who is directing traffic at the corner of 
the street, the same traffic being controlled by red 
and green lights: hundreds of exigencies rise up 
towards me: pedestrian crossings, notices prohibi-
tions; collectives (a branch of the Credit Lyonnais, 
a cafe, a church, blocks of flats, and also a visible 
seriality: people queueing in front of a shop) and 
instruments (pavements, a thoroughfare, a taxi 
rank. a bus stop etc., proclaiming with their frozen 
voices how they are to be used) [...] Later I will go 
down and become their thing.38
For Sartre this worked-matter is the vehicle for 
actions that enable consciousness to give meaning 
to being. ‘A ticket is a ticket rather than a paste-
board rectangle only insofar as it is supported by 
consciousness, but you cannot get into the theater 
without it. By means of worked-matter we individu-
ally and collectively carve out our being in a world by 
our concrete actions or praxis’.39 This group praxis 
also relates to Sartre’s third form of being, being 
for-others (pour-autrui). Group praxis constitutes 
itself in given moments, with an emphasis on the 
ontological empowerment of the individual, while 
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Spontaneous memorials suggest that these acts 
of group praxis indicate a need. There is a need 
to acknowledge the transition from for-itself to 
in-itself (life to death) for-others. Senie suggests 
that spontaneous memorials replace the role that 
cemeteries and burial rituals played in traditional 
societies. Each town had a space for the dead, and 
the remains of the dead were brought through the 
center of town as part of town life.45 This acknowl-
edgement of death is certainly absent from many 
North American contexts, where ‘planned communi-
ties’ have designed every need of the living within 
a ten minute walking distance, and where every-
thing is accounted for except the one act we will 
all encounter, death. Moreover in times of war, 
acknowledgement of death in life is never more 
present.
Conclusion: Phenomenology and ontology
An ontology of architecture seeks to understand the 
question: what kind of thing is architecture? Surely 
an explanation of its materials, modes of production, 
and representations cannot completely account for 
an ontology. Alberto Perez-Gomez eloquently notes 
that ‘architecture hides sometimes’.46 Perhaps 
Sartre’s interpretation of the imagining conscious-
ness reveals what is hidden. Sartre’s theory of 
negation demonstrates that architecture can invite 
us to imagine what or who is not. With regard to 
in-situ commemorative structures, we know that a 
great deal of effort is made to literally manufacture 
memory for us. Preservation specialists, architec-
tural historians and exhibit designers are consulted, 
and curatorial collection management policies are 
established. Debates ensue to determine the proper 
message, the materials to be preserved, and the way 
it is presented to the public. Yet, equally important 
is what is not there and a visitor’s ability to imagine 
it. Regarding sacred places, Lopes posits that Ise 
demonstrates that an architectural ontology may 
include architecture as performance. Indeed, the 
role of nothingness at Ise triggers not only what is 
not, but asks us to consider architecture as  ‘events,’ 
after September 11, 2001, numerous spontaneous 
memorials emerged as individual testimonies in a 
collective praxis that created hallowed spaces within 
the city of New York. According to Joseph Catalano, 
negation in collective practice ‘means both the 
positive force of transcending matter and the weak-
ening of praxis through seriality’.42 Indeed, Sartre 
argues in Critique of Dialectical Reason that we 
will realise the ‘dialectic moment only when group 
praxis has been identified as part of our history’.43 
If we fail to see our actions as historically situated, 
they become part of the status quo. For example, 
over time, contributions made to most spontaneous 
memorials seemingly defer to what is expected at 
these locations.
Consider the Flight 93 spontaneous memorial, 
which is still performing while the selected, perma-
nent memorial is debated. Soon after the crash, the 
people of Shanksville, Pennsylvania paid tribute to 
the 40 unsuspecting passengers and crew members 
who perished. They erected a single fence on a 
small plateau, a substantial distance from the crater 
created when flight 93 crashed to the ground [Fig. 
5]. The fence does not enclose anything, but serves 
as a repository for items brought by visitors to the 
site. Despite its isolated location (compared with 
Washington D.C. and New York City), many family 
members of the victims have come to Shanksville to 
commemorate this tragic event. By 2007 this memo-
rial received visitors from all over North America. 
Walking around this windy, barren field, past the 
benches dedicated to the passengers, the angel 
plaques in patriotic garb, and the fence that is 
draped with hundreds of items, one is taken by the 
amount of worked-matter left in commemoration 
[Fig. 5]. During my visit the majority of the contribu-
tions are American flags, T-shirts, and hand-made 
signs that say things like ‘thanks for saving us.’ 
Other messages have been left on everything, from 
post-it notes to rocks to guardrails.44
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particular occurrences rather than only types with 
particular properties. This suggests that events as 
part of architecture go beyond architecture’s mate-
rial qualities to engage experience as part of what 
it is. Lastly, spontaneous memorials and Sartre’s 
ideas regarding group praxis indicate that there are 
immaterial needs of people, particularly regarding 
the mourning of the deceased as part of life.
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